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From Warfare to Welfare: Reconceptualizing 
Drug Sentencing During the Opioid Crisis 
Jelani Jefferson Exum 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The War on Drugs officially began in 1971 when President Nixon 
decried drug abuse as “public enemy number one.”1  The goal of the war 
rhetoric was clear—to cast drug abuse and the drug offender as dangerous 
adversaries of the law-abiding public, requiring military-like tactics to 
defeat.  Criminal sentencing would come to be the main weapon used in 
this pressing combat.  In continuation of the war efforts, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 was passed under President Reagan, establishing a 
weight-based, and highly punitive, mandatory minimum sentencing 
approach to drug offenses that has persisted in some form for the last thirty 
years.2  When the Act passed, crack cocaine was touted as the greatest drug 
threat, and crack cocaine offenders—the vast majority of whom were 
Black—were subjected to the harshest mandatory minimum penalties.3  
Like any war, the consequences of the War on Drugs has had widespread 
casualties, including (but not limited to) the devastation of many 
communities, families, and individuals; the increase in racial disparities in 
punishment; and fiscal catastrophe in penal systems across the country.4  
What the War on Drugs has not done is eradicate drug abuse in the United 
States.  And now, nearly fifty years after drugs became our national 
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 1.   Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, PUB. 
PAPERS 738, 738 (June 17, 1971) [hereinafter Intensified Program]. 
 2.   Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1002, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 4 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)). 
 3.   See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING 5 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities_aclu_submission_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5JSF-LRS3]. 
 4.   See, e.g., Eric L. Jensen et al., Social Consequences of the War on Drugs: The Legacy of 
Failed Policy, 15 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 100 (2004) (discussing the repercussions of the War on 
Drugs and the resulting increased rates of incarceration). 
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enemy, we have a new face of drug crime—the opioid addict.5 
The current Administration has recognized that “[d]rug addiction and 
opioid abuse are ravaging America.”6  However, rather than ramping up 
punishment for opioid offenders through lengthier drug sentencing, in 
October 2017 the opioid crisis officially became a Public Health 
Emergency under federal law.7  And while it is largely understood that this 
was mostly a symbolic statement with little practical effect,8 the rhetoric 
is markedly different than it was during the purported crack epidemic of 
the 1980s.  Rather than drug offenders being the enemy, the opioid addict 
has been cast as the American Everyman, and the opioid addiction 
problem has become known as the “crisis next door” that “can affect any 
American, from all-state football captains to stay-at-home mothers.”9 
Now that the drug emergency is portrayed as destroying wholesome 
American communities—as opposed to poor, crime-ridden communities 
of color—the tone has changed from punishment toward treatment and 
rehabilitation.  The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) has described opioid misuse and 
addiction as “a serious national crisis that affects public health as well as 
social and economic welfare.”10  While we are in the midst of this shift in 
messaging about drug addiction, it is an ideal time for drug sentencing as 
a whole to be reconceptualized from use as a weapon—designed to 
destroy—to having a public welfare agenda.  To do this it requires 
recasting potential drug offenders as community members, rather than 
enemies.  This change in perspective and approach also necessitates 
understanding drug crime as undeterred by incarceration.  The tasks must 
                                                          
 5.   When using terms like “the opioid crisis” and “the opioid addict,” experts are referring to 
“[t]he misuse of and addiction to opioids—including prescription pain relievers, heroin, and synthetic 
opioids such as fentanyl.”  See Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT. INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/N7PY-
LVPV] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 6.   The Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/opioids/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZXJ5-LD49] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 7.   Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. 
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opioid%20PHE%20Declaration-no-sig.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5J67-46TG]. See also Memorandum on Combatting the National Drug Demand and 
Opioid Crisis, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 788, at § 2 (Oct. 26, 2017) (requiring the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to consider declaring the opioid crisis a public health emergency). 
 8.   What Does it Mean to Declare a Public Health Emergency Over the Opioid Crisis?, GEO. 
WASH. U. MILKEN INST. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://publichealth.gwu.edu/content/what-does-it-
mean-declare-public-health-emergency-over-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/J4XS-NBRJ] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). 
 9.   THE CRISIS NEXT DOOR, https://www.crisisnextdoor.gov/ [https://perma.cc/XP23-DFHS] 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 10.   Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 5. 
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be to decide on a goal of drug sentencing, and to develop multifaceted 
approaches to address and eradicate the underlying sources of the drug 
problem.  When this is done, we may find that more appropriate purposes 
of punishment—rehabilitation and retribution—compel us to think beyond 
incarceration, and certainly mandatory minimum sentencing laws, as the 
appropriate punishment type at all. 
II. SENTENCING AS WEAPON: THE WAR ON DRUGS 
In 1971, President Nixon launched the War on Drugs, which marked 
a turning point in sentencing law; however, this was not the first time the 
federal government imposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses.  Rather, it imposed the first mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
for drug offenses through the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act in 
1951.11  For various drug offenses, the act carried mandatory minimum 
penalties of two, five, or ten years of imprisonment depending on a 
person’s prior convictions.12  In 1956, Congress expanded this punitive 
approach in the Narcotic Control Act to include more mandatory minimum 
penalties for drug crimes.13  However, by the 1960s, this punitive approach 
to drug sentencing was becoming unpopular.14  And in sweeping reform, 
in 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act, which repealed almost every mandatory minimum penalty 
for drug offenses.15  According to the Congressional Record, the purpose 
of the change was to institute “a more realistic, more flexible, and thus 
more effective system of punishment and deterrence of violations of the 
Federal narcotic and dangerous drug laws.”16  However, just a year later, 
President Nixon set the stage for an about-face on drug policy by calling 
for a “war” to commence.  In his words, given at a now-famous press 
conference on June 17, 1971, President Nixon proclaimed, “[i]n order to 
fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out 
offensive” on drug abuse.17  And, with those words, he laid the foundation 
                                                          
 11.   See Act of Nov. 2, 1951, § 1, Pub. L. No. 82–255, 65 Stat. 767, 767–68 (amending the 
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act). 
 12.   See id. 
 13.   See Narcotic Control Act of 1956, §§ 103, 105–08, Pub. L. No. 84–728, 70 Stat. 567, 568–
72. 
 14.   U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN 
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (2011), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter 
_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKW6-Q5NU]. 
 15.   Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970)). 
 16.   H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4638. 
 17.   Intensified Program, supra note 1, at 738. 
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for a return to rigid, punitive drug sentencing.  But, perhaps even more 
damaging, was that the war rhetoric cast the would-be drug offenders as 
dangerous enemies to be fought with the force of the criminal justice 
system. 
The Richard Nixon Foundation claims that Nixon’s drug war “has 
been blamed, rather unfairly, for steering national drug policy to the law 
enforcement modality most familiar to the nation today.”18  By “law 
enforcement modality,” the Foundation is referring to harsh mandatory 
minimum penalties for drug crimes.  In defense of Nixon, the Foundation 
points out that it was President Nixon who created the Special Action 
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) and “requested $155 
million in new funds, $105 million which would be made for treatment 
and rehabilitation nationwide.”19  In the words of the Foundation, “[f]or 
the first time in the history of the United States, the government offered 
treatment to any drug addict that needed and wanted it; heroin addicts were 
now given a choice of rehabilitation without fear of being criminalized for 
their drug addiction.”20  It is true that SAODAP took a treatment approach 
to the perceived drug abuse problem by supporting federally-funded drug 
treatment programs and conducting research on drug abuse and 
addiction.21  However, even in supporting treatment, Nixon held fast to the 
imagery of war.  In a handbook issued by SAODAP, Nixon penned a letter 
calling for the American people to “represent the front-line soldiers in this 
critical battle.”22  He also described the federal government approach to 
the “battle against drug abuse.”23  An important part of the fight was 
targeting drug trafficking through enhanced criminal penalties.  As Nixon 
explained, “[d]omestically we have developed strong new laws and tough 
new law enforcement efforts, backed by more money and greater 
manpower.”24  And though “drug abuse,” and not necessarily the drug 
abuser, is what Nixon characterized as “public enemy number one,”25 he 
used imagery that necessitated putting a face to the enemy.  After all, 
                                                          
 18.   Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug 
Problem, RICHARD NIXON FOUND (June 29, 2016), https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/ 
26404/ [https://perma.cc/ZEF9-4RLB] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION, SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR 
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION ANSWERS THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT DRUG 
ABUSE 2–3 (1972), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED075187.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NWH-2ZJM]. 
 22.   Richard Nixon, Foreword to id. at ii. 
 23.   Id. 
 24.   Id. at i. 
 25.   Id. 
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according to Nixon, there was some menace out there who “creeps quietly 
into homes and destroys the bonds of family.”26  This adversary, pitted 
against the unsuspecting, wholesome American, had to be defeated. 
A. Locating the Enemy 
It is now no secret that pandering to racist beliefs about criminality 
underscored President Nixon’s 1968 “law and order” presidential 
campaign.27  As Professor Michelle Alexander explains in her prominent 
text The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 
“By 1968, 81 percent of those responding to the Gallup Poll agreed with 
the statement that ‘law and order has broken down in this country,’ and 
the majority blamed ‘Negroes who start riots’ and ‘Communists.’”28  
Nixon fed into these views in crafting the rhetoric for his campaign.  While 
viewing one of his own campaign ads, he was accidentally recorded 
saying, “[The ad] hits it right on the nose.  It’s all about those damn Negro-
Puerto Rican groups out there.”29  Later, Nixon’s domestic policy advisor, 
John Ehrlichman, would reportedly admit that “[t]he Nixon campaign in 
1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar 
left and Black people.”30  According to the report of Ehrlichman’s 1994 
interview,31 Ehrlichman divulged the racist strategy in this way: 
You understand what I’m saying?  We knew we couldn’t make it illegal 
to be either against the war or Black, but by getting the public to associate 
the hippies with marijuana and Blacks with heroin, and then 
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.  We 
could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and 
vilify them night after night on the evening news.  Did we know we were 
                                                          
 26.   Id. 
 27.   Nixon’s own racist views toward Blacks, Jews, and other groups were captured in recordings 
released in 2010 by the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.  For an account of these tapes, see 
Rob Stein, New Nixon Tapes Reveal Anti-Semitic, Racist Remarks, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/11/AR2010121102890.html 
[https://perma.cc/WJ8A-369V]. 
 28.   MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 46 (rev. ed. 2011). 
 29.   Id. at 47. 
 30.   Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG (Apr. 2016), 
https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/ [https://perma.cc/A25M-5FNX]. 
 31.   Ehrlichman reportedly gave these statements to reporter Dan Baum in a 1994 interview.  Id.  
Baum did not publish these remarks until 2012 and again in 2016 in Harper’s Magazine.  Dan Baum, 
Truth, Lies, and Audiotape, in THE MOMENT: WILD, POIGNANT, LIFE-CHANGING STORIES FROM 125 
WRITERS AND ARTISTS FAMOUS & OBSCURE 174, 175 (Larry Smith ed., 2012); Baum, supra note 30.  
Ehrlichman died in 1999.  Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted Blacks, 
Hippies, CNN (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-
nixon-drug-war-blacks-hippie/index.html [https://perma.cc/P2KA-ARG8]. 
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lying about the drugs?  Of course we did.32 
Whether one believes the accuracy of these revelations,33 disrupting 
Black communities is just what the war on drugs accomplished.  Nixon 
seems to have known that this was the eventual course.  While flying over 
the New York City borough of Queens in June 1972, he was quoted as 
saying, “The people down there could care less about treatment or 
education.  All they want to do is lock the folks up involved with drugs . . . 
just lock them up.”34  And, though Nixon never signed extensive, tougher 
drug sentencing punishment reform into law, the “just lock them up” 
attitude that he identified and the focus on Black communities that such a 
view exploited would prevail. 
B. Firing the Sentencing Weapon 
It was President Ronald Reagan who pushed the War on Drugs agenda 
forward.35  On October 14, 1982, Reagan declared that illegal drugs were 
a threat to U.S. National Security.36  Congress followed his lead and passed 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which created highly punitive, weight 
based mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.  In doing so, 
Congress was reacting to the war rhetoric without giving the country’s 
actual drug issue true study.  A closer look at the infamous 100-to-1 
powder cocaine to crack ratio established through the Act reveals this 
trigger-happy Congressional response. 
The 1980s were a time of misleading media-fueled concern regarding 
the dangers of crack cocaine.37  Perhaps the most well-known news 
                                                          
 32.   Baum, supra note 30. 
 33.   Three of Ehrlichman’s former colleagues questioned whether Ehrlichman made the 
statement, and, if he did, contended that he made it sarcastically.  They also stated the war on drugs’ 
impetus was not based on race.  Hilary Hanson, Nixon Aides Suggest Colleague was Kidding About 
Drug War Being Designed to Target Black People, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2016), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/richard-nixon-drug-war-john-ehrlichman_us_56f58be6e4b0a 
3721819ec61?j4cvxkk6gn39b2o6r [https://perma.cc/A2SZ-ZN6B].  Ehrlichman’s children also 
dispute the quote.  LoBianco, supra note 31. 
 34.   Edward Jay Epstein, The Krogh File—the Politics of “Law and Order”, 39 PUB. INT. 99, 
121 (1975). 
 35.   Andrew Glass, Reagan Declares ‘War on Drugs,’ October 14, 1982, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 
2010, 4:44 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/10/reagan-declares-war-on-drugs-october-14-
1982-043552 [https://perma.cc/P4R7-XXWH]. 
 36.   Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and 
Organized Crime, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1313, 1315–16 (Oct. 14, 1982) (outlining a plan to fight organized 
crime generally and drug trafficking specifically). 
 37.   “‘Crack’ is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing 
cocaine hydrochloride [powder cocaine] and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, 
rocklike form.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1(c) n.D (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
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account encouraging this fear was the cocaine-induced death of the 
popular college basketball star Len Bias in June 1986.38  It had been widely 
reported that Bias died from a crack overdose, and the public outcry was 
heard in the halls of Congress.  Though it was eventually discovered that 
Len Bias died from a combination of snorting powder cocaine and using 
alcohol, and not from crack cocaine use at all, the fear created by stories 
like that of Len Bias was pervasive and the effects were long-lasting.39 
Further, Len Bias was Black, and the panic surrounding crack was 
definitely colored by racial stereotypes.  In the 1994 Eastern District of 
Missouri case United States v. Clary, Judge Clyde Cahill explained the 
damaging racism of the media attention this way: 
Crack cocaine eased into the mainstream of the drug culture about 1985 
and immediately absorbed the media’s attention.  Between 1985 and 
1986, over 400 reports had been broadcast by the networks.  Media 
accounts of crack-user horror stories appeared daily on every major 
channel and in every major newspaper.  Many of the stories were racist.  
Despite the statistical data that whites were prevalent among crack users, 
rare was the interview with a young black person who had avoided drugs 
and the drug culture, and even rarer was any media association with 
whites and crack.  Images of young black men daily saturated the screens 
of our televisions.  These distorted images branded onto the public mind 
and the minds of legislators that young black men were solely 
responsible for the drug crisis in America.  The media created a 
stereotype of a crack dealer as a young black male, unemployed, gang 
affiliated, gun toting, and a menace to society.40 
This racialized impact is evident in another enduring image of the 
crack hysteria—the crack baby.  The Sentencing Project described this 
imagery and its erroneous nature aptly: 
The notion of the “crack baby” became common in the 1980s and was 
associated mostly with African American infants who experienced the 
effects of withdrawal from crack.  Over time, the medical field 
determined the effects of crack on a fetus had been overstated.  Deborah 
Frank, a professor of Pediatrics at Boston University describes the “crack 
baby” as “a grotesque media stereotype [and] not a scientific diagnosis.”  
                                                          
2018). 
 38.   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 122 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/research/ 
congressional-reports/1995-report-congress-cocaine-and-federal-sentencing-policy [https://perma.cc/ 
HNK2-RDYJ]. 
 39.   See Carol A. Brook, Mukasey Puts Latest Crack in Truth on Drugs, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 7, 
2008), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2008-03-07-0803060576-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/T3YV-CSPE]. 
 40.   846 F. Supp. 768, 783 (E.D. Mo.) (citations omitted), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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Indeed, she found the negative effects of crack use on the fetus are 
similar to the negative effects of tobacco or alcohol use, poor prenatal 
care or poor nutrition on the fetus.41 
At the same time that images of the Black crack baby and crack mother 
were frightening concerned (white) Americans, the story was being told 
that crack was significantly worse than powder cocaine.42  The distorted 
story has been explained this way: 
The driving force behind passage of these anti-crack laws was the 
exaggerated claims made in the media on a near-daily basis.  Multiple 
stories warned of “crack-crazed” addicts.  In the months before the 1986 
elections, more than 1,000 stories on cocaine appeared in the national 
press, including five cover stories in Time and Newsweek.  Time 
magazine called crack cocaine the issue of the year.43 
Though the concern focused on crack cocaine and the misleading 
image of the Black people using crack, scientific data proved this concern 
to be misplaced.  Studies show that “[t]here are no pharmacological 
differences between crack and powder cocaine to justify their differential 
treatment under the law.”44  Still, the public outcry and misinformation 
pushed Congress to rush the 1986 Drug Act through the legislative 
process.45  As Judge Cahill explained: 
Legislators used these media accounts as informational support for the 
enactment of the crack statute.  The Congressional Record, prior to 
                                                          
 41.   RESEARCH & ADVOCACY FOR REFORM, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEDERAL CRACK 
COCAINE SENTENCING 6 (Oct. 2010), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/federal-crack-
cocaine-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/2NR3-U6PA] (alteration in original) (first citing U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 68 
(2007); then citing Cocaine Pharmacology, “Crack Babies,” Violence: Hearing Before the U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 191, 195 (2002) (statement of Deborah Frank, M.D., 
Professor at Boston University School of Medicine)). 
 42.   CARL L. HART, JOANNE CSETE, & DON HABIBI, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., METHAMPHETAMINE: 
FACT VS. FICTION AND LESSONS FROM THE CRACK HYSTERIA 2 (2014), https://www.opensociety 
foundations.org/sites/default/files/methamphetamine-dangers-exaggerated-20140218.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/8DUF-H8CV].  
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 5 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT], https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/200205-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/20 
0205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U2E-BFVC]; see also 1995 
REPORT, supra note 38, at 122 (“[F]ollowing Bias’s death, newspapers across the country ran 
headlines and stories containing a quote from Dr. Dennis Smyth, Maryland’s Assistant Medical 
Examiner, that Bias probably died of ‘free-basing’ cocaine.  Newspapers that ran such headlines 
included the Los Angeles Times, USA Today, the Chicago Tribune, The Atlanta Constitution, and the 
Washington Post.”). 
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enactment of the statute, is replete with news articles submitted by 
members for their colleagues’ consideration which labeled crack dealers 
as black youths and gangs.  Members of Congress also introduced into 
the record media reports containing language that was either overtly or 
subtly racist, and which exacerbated white fears that the “crack problem” 
would spill out of the ghettos.46 
Therefore, in response to the perceived national drug emergency, the 
1986 Drug Act passed with no committee hearings and no accompanying 
House or Senate reports, and the disparate 100-to-1 powder-to-crack 
cocaine sentencing ratio was born.47 
Under this new Act, an offense had to involve 100 times more powder 
cocaine for a defendant to receive the same sentence as defendants 
convicted of a crack cocaine offense.  Offenses involving five grams of 
cocaine base (commonly referred to as “crack”) were treated as equivalent 
to those involving 500 grams of cocaine hydrochloride (commonly 
referred to as “powder cocaine”) for triggering a five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence.48  Likewise, 5000 grams of powder cocaine were 
necessary to trigger the same ten-year mandatory minimum sentence that 
was triggered by fifty grams of crack.49  Though this new sentencing 
scheme was seemingly race-neutral, its enforcement certainly was not.  
The 100-to-1 powder-to-crack cocaine sentencing ratio was incorporated 
into the Federal Sentencing Guidelines50 and has given police, prosecutors, 
and judges weapons to disproportionately imprison Black offenders.  The 
incredible racial disparity that resulted has persisted for over three 
decades. 
C. The Carnage of War: Drug Sentencing and Racial Disparities 
The full force of the 1986 Act was dispatched against Black 
                                                          
 46.   United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783–84 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (citations omitted), rev’d, 
34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 47.   See 2002 REPORT, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
 48.   Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1002, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-
4 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)).  Pursuant to the resulting 21 U.S.C. § 841, a five-
year mandatory minimum applied to any trafficking offense of five grams of crack or 500 grams of 
powder, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii); its ten-year mandatory minimum applied to any trafficking 
offense of fifty grams of crack or 5000 grams of powder, § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).  The 1986 Drug Act 
imposed the heavier penalty on “cocaine base” without specifying that to mean crack.  However, in 
1993, the Sentencing Commission clarified that “‘[c]ocaine base,’ for the purposes of this guideline, 
means ‘crack.’”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, vol. I, amend. 487 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2003) (effective Nov. 1, 1993). 
 49.   Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, § 1002. 
 50.   See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007). 
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communities.  As is the scene with any warzone, the result was 
devastating.  In a February 1995 report, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
related that a startling 88.3 percent of crack cocaine offenders were 
Black.51  The Commission cited to a study conducted by the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics finding that, due to the 100-to-1 ratio, “the average 
sentence imposed for crack trafficking was twice as long as for trafficking 
in powdered cocaine.”52  Ultimately, the Sentencing Commission 
concluded that “[t]he 100-to-1 crack cocaine to powder cocaine quantity 
ratio is a primary cause of the growing disparity between sentences for 
Black and White federal defendants.”53  In May of the same year, the 
Commission urged Congress to equalize crack and powder cocaine 
penalties.54  Congress rejected the proposed amendment to the Sentencing 
Guidelines—“the first time in the guidelines’ history [that] Congress and 
the president rejected a guideline amendment approved by the 
[C]ommission.”55  In 1997, the Sentencing Commission again issued a 
report unanimously recommending “the elimination of the 100:1 ratio.”56  
Congress, however, did not act on this recommendation.57 
This call for racial equality through a change to drug sentencing came 
again in the Commission’s 2002 Report to Congress, in which the 
Sentencing Commission explained its findings that an “overwhelming 
majority of crack cocaine offenders” were Black—“91.4 percent in 1992 
and 84.7 percent in 2000.”58  The Commission also reported that “[i]n 
addition, the average sentence for crack cocaine offenses (118 months) is 
44 months—or almost 60 percent—longer than the average sentence for 
powder cocaine offenses (74 months), in large part due to the effects of 
the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio.”59  As a result of the hearings and 
findings, the Commission again advocated for a reduction in the 100:1 
                                                          
 51.   1995 REPORT, supra note 38, at 152. 
 52.   Id. at 153 (quoting DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986–90, at 1 (1993)). 
 53.   Id. at 154. 
 54.   See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 
25,074, 25,075–77 (proposed May 10, 1995). 
 55.   DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE 
SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 6 (2006), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/NPN9-7ZM9] (citing Act of Oct. 30, 1995, § 1, Pub. L. No 104-38, 109 Stat. 334, 344). 
 56.   Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997)). 
 57.   Id. 
 58.   2002 REPORT, supra note 45, at 62. 
 59.   Id. at 90. 
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ratio, stating in its report that: (1) “the current penalties exaggerate the 
relative harmfulness of crack cocaine”; (2) the “current penalties sweep 
too broadly and apply most often to lower level offenders”; (3) the “current 
quantity-based penalties overstate the seriousness of most crack cocaine 
offenses and fail to provide adequate proportionality”; and (4) the “current 
penalties’ severity mostly impacts minorities.”60  However, again, 
Congress did not respond.61 
By 2004, the Sentencing Commission was directly expressing its 
views on the racial injustice of the cocaine sentencing guidelines.  The 
Commission explained: 
This one sentencing rule contributes more to the differences in average 
sentences between African-American and White offenders than any 
possible effect of discrimination.  Revising the crack cocaine 
thresholds would better reduce the gap than any other single policy 
change, and it would dramatically improve the fairness of the federal 
sentencing system.62 
Finally, in 2007, after three more years of inaction by Congress, the 
Sentencing Commission took the initiative and enacted a series of 
Guideline amendments that it called “only a partial step in mitigating the 
unwarranted sentencing disparity that exists between Federal powder and 
crack cocaine defendants.”63  Amendment 706, effective November 1, 
2007, reduced by two levels the base offense level for most crack 
offenses.64  Despite twenty years of recognizing the hugely racially 
disparate consequences of using sentencing as a weapon in the War on 
Drugs, it took until 2010 for Congress to pass federal legislation reducing 
the 100:1 ratio—and even then Congress did not change the destructive 
                                                          
 60.   Id. at v–viii. 
 61.   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 51 (2004), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys 
/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FDU-6QP8] (noting 
Congress did not act on the Commission’s 2002 recommendation). 
 62.   Id. at 132 (emphasis added). 
 63.   U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for 
Crack Cocaine Offenses, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ussc.gov/about/ 
news/press-releases/december-11-2007 [https://perma.cc/F9ZV-K2MR]. 
 64.   Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,882, 51,882–83 (Sept. 11, 
2007).  The Sentencing Guidelines assigns a base offense level to every federal criminal offense.  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  Because the Sentencing 
Commission adopted a system of “real offense sentencing,” chapter three of the Sentencing Guidelines 
also includes several sections of adjustments that add points to the base offense level based on 
particular offense factors and offender conduct (i.e., role in the offense, type of victim, etc.).  Id. at ch. 
3.  The sum is the total offense level which corresponds to the Sentencing Grid and is matched up with 
a criminal history category to result in a sentencing range.  Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
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nature of drug sentencing. 
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (the 
“FSA”), which decreased the powder to crack cocaine sentencing ratio to 
nearly 18:1.65  Now, under the FSA, it takes twenty-eight grams (instead 
of the former five grams) of crack cocaine to trigger a five-year mandatory 
minimum imprisonment and 280 grams (rather than fifty grams) of crack 
cocaine to trigger a ten-year mandatory minimum imprisonment term.66  
The 500 grams and five kilograms (or 5000 grams) of powder cocaine that 
it takes to activate the five-year and ten-year mandatory minimum, 
respectively, remained unchanged.67  The mandatory minimum for a first-
time offense of simple possession was eliminated, and first-time simple 
possession of any quantity of crack cocaine, like powder cocaine, will 
result in a sentence no longer than one year.68  Though this was a major 
change, because it did not result in a one-to-one parity in cocaine 
sentencing, the Act really took the form that Rep. Ron Paul said should 
more aptly be called “the Slightly Fairer Resentencing Act.”69  At fiscal 
yearend 2012, “[t]he vast majority of crack cocaine offenders (88%) were 
non-Hispanic black or African American,” meaning that the sights of the 
lengthiest sentencing weapon are still set on Blacks.70  But a new battle 
was seemingly on the horizon, only its casualties were seen as the good 
guys, worthy of saving, rather than the enemy. 
III. THE OPIOID CRISIS AND A WELFARE APPROACH 
Today’s drug news is not overrun with images of crack addicts who 
must be eradicated before they infiltrate our safe neighborhoods.  Instead, 
the current media fixation is on what has been deemed “the opioid crisis.”  
In January 2017, the New York Times ran a story titled “Inside a Killer 
Drug Epidemic: A Look at America’s Opioid Crisis.”71  The startling 
headline was followed by what the news outlet described as “stories of a 
national affliction that has swept the country, from cities on the West Coast 
                                                          
 65.   Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841). 
 66.   21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, § 3 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012)). 
 69.   156 Cong. Rec. 14,395 (2010) (statement of Rep. Paul). 
 70.   SAM TAXY ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL PRISON: 
ESTIMATES OF CHARACTERISTICS BASED ON LINKED DATA 3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7F2-2PD7]. 
 71.   Julie Bosman, Inside a Killer Drug Epidemic: A Look at America’s Opioid Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/opioid-crisis-epidemic.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZG5T-9VCK]. 
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to bedroom communities in the Northeast.”72  The article refers to towns 
“where people overdose in the aisles of dollar stores.”73  Other media 
sources have also addressed the topic with alarm.  The Guardian issued an 
article calling the opioid crisis “a national trauma” and revealed that 
“[o]verdoses killed more people in the US in 2015 than car crashes and 
gun deaths combined.”74  These accounts are not without expert backing.  
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) dedicates a webpage to the 
“Opioid Overdose Crisis” on which it explains that “[e]very day, more 
than 130 people in the United States die after overdosing on opioids.”75  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also has a webpage 
devoted to the opioid crisis.  According to the CDC data shared there, 
“[o]verdose deaths from opioids . . . have increased almost six times since 
1999.  Overdoses involving opioids killed more than 47,000 people in 
2017, and 36% of those deaths involved prescription opioids.”76  It would 
seem, then, that drug abuse is once again America’s public enemy number 
one.  However, both drug abuse and the abuser have been cast in a very 
different light than the enemy in the War on Drugs. 
During the opioid epidemic, we have seen a shift in drug policy 
rhetoric from one of warfare to welfare.  After declaring the opioid crisis 
a national Public Health Emergency, the White House launched an 
informational website, CrisisNextDoor.gov, “where Americans can share 
their own stories about the dangers of opioid addiction.”77  As the 
President explained, “[t]his epidemic can affect anyone, and that’s why we 
want to educate everyone.”78  The Crisis Next Door website directs visitors 
to “See America’s Stories” and invites them to “[s]hare your story below 
by uploading a video about how you overcame addiction, volunteered at a 
recovery center, or worked as a family to help a loved one get on the path 
to recovery.”79  Rather than having a crazed, dangerous enemy threatening 
the wholesome (white) American family—as was the image during the 
                                                          
 72.   Id. 
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Joanna Walters, America’s Opioid Crisis: How Prescription Drugs Sparked a National 
Trauma, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/25/ 
americas-opioid-crisis-how-prescription-drugs-sparked-a-national-trauma [https://perma.cc/7JGR-
WJSG]. 
 75.   Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 5. 
 76.   Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (citations 
omitted), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html [https://perma.cc/V6CW-UJQP] (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
 77.   The Opioid Crisis, supra note 6. 
 78.   Remarks in Manchester, New Hampshire, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 168, at 4 (Mar. 
19, 2018). 
 79.   THE CRISIS NEXT DOOR, supra note 9. 
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crack epidemic—we now have “loved ones” who need help. 
A. Neighbors, not Enemies: Race and the Opioid Addict 
It is not insignificant that the demographics of the affected populations 
are markedly different when one compares the War on Drugs to the Opioid 
Crisis.  According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, from 
2010–2013, “the prevalence of [opioid abuse] was highest among whites 
(72.29%), with lower prevalence among blacks (9.23%), Hispanics 
13.82%, and others 4.66%.”80  In other words, opioid abuse is a very white 
problem.  Contrarily, in its 1995 report to Congress, the Sentencing 
Commission acknowledged that “[p]ublic opinion tends to associate the 
country’s drug crisis, specifically its perceived ‘crack problem,’ with 
Black, innercity neighborhoods.”81  The injustice in this perception of the 
purported crack epidemic is that Blacks were not actually using crack at a 
higher rate than whites.  Data from the National Household Survey on 
Drug Abuse revealed the following in 1991, five years after the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 was passed: 
[O]f those reporting cocaine use at least once in the reporting year, 75 
percent were White, 15 percent Black, and 10 percent Hispanic.  And of 
those reporting crack use at least once in the reporting year, 52 percent 
were White, 38 percent were Black, and 10 percent were Hispanic.82 
Despite the majority of crack users being white, the War on Drugs 
aimed its sentencing weapon at Black communities.  The public response 
to the opioid crisis, however, has not been to criminalize communities.  In 
fact, rather than being called an addiction, opioid abuse is now referred to 
as “Opioid Use Disorder.”83  On all fronts, the discourse, and the response, 
has changed from one of warfare against communities to welfare for 
communities. 
B. Community Welfare Responses to the Opioid Crisis 
In October 2018, a year after declaring the opioid crisis a public health 
                                                          
 80.   THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION AND THE OPIOID CRISIS, 
FINAL REPORT 25 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_ 
Report_Draft_11-1-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH46-G9SD]. 
 81.   1995 REPORT, supra note 38, at 34.  
 82.   Id. 
 83.   See, e.g., Prevent Opioid Use Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/prevention/opioid-use-disorder.html [https://perma.cc/SJF9-
7443] (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
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emergency, the President signed into law the Substance Use-Disorder 
Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and 
Communities Act, known as the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities 
Act.84  The purpose of the SUPPORT Act is to “provide for opioid use 
disorder prevention, recovery, and treatment.”85  It is important to note that 
this was not criminal justice legislation.  Instead, the Act directs funding 
to federal agencies and states in order to support increased addiction 
treatment and to set policies in place to screen for and prevent the abuse 
of prescription opioids.86  Likewise, government agencies have taken a 
treatment approach to the opioid epidemic.  The Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA), an agency of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, has awarded over $396 million to address the 
opioid crisis.87  The purpose of the grants is to “enable HRSA-funded 
community health centers, academic institutions, and rural organizations 
to expand access to integrated substance use disorder and mental health 
services.”88  Under an initiative called the Rural Communities Opioid 
Response Program-Planning, HRSA has given $19 million in grants to 
organizations that “develop plans to implement evidence-based opioid use 
disorder prevention, treatment, and recovery interventions designed to 
reduce opioid overdoses among rural populations at the highest risk for 
substance use disorders.”89  The HRSA website does not indicate any such 
investments in inner cities or funding related to combatting cocaine use. 
The HRSA also hosts the Addressing Opioid Use Disorder in Pregnant 
Women & New Moms Challenge.90  The goal of the prize competition is 
“to support tech innovations to improve access to quality health care, 
including substance use disorder treatment, recovery, and support services 
                                                          
 84.   Marianna Sotomayor, Trump Signs Sweeping Opioid Bill with Vow to End ‘Scourge’ of 
Drug Addiction, NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/trump-
signs-sweeping-opioid-bill-vow-end-scourge-drug-addiction-n923976 [https://perma.cc/8KQQ-
66T8]. 
 85.   Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018). 
 86.   See Jennifer M. Lohse & Brad Lerner, SUPPORT Act: Highlights of the 2018 Opioid 
Legislation, AM. HEALTH LAW. ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.healthlawyers.org/Members/ 
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 87.   FY18 HRSA Opioids Fundings, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., 
https://www.hrsa.gov/opioids/HRSA-fy18-awards.html [https://perma.cc/F5AN-EE64] (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2019). 
 88.   Id. 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Id. 
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for pregnant women with opioid use disorders, their infants, and families, 
especially those in rural and geographically isolated areas.”91 This concern 
for the welfare of the pregnant, opioid-addicted mother is a far cry from 
the characterization of the irresponsible, Black crack mother who was 
committing a crime against her ill-fated, Black crack baby.92  Clearly, the 
messaging about the illegal use of drugs has changed dramatically.  What 
has not changed significantly, however, is the sentencing of drug 
offenders. 
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING DRUG SENTENCING 
Even as the discourse about drug addiction has changed from one 
focusing on annihilating a drug enemy to one focused on the recovery of 
victims, the mandatory minimum sentences applicable to drug offenses 
remain largely unchanged since the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.  The 
most recent criminal justice reform, the First Step Act, has been hailed as 
legislation that will bring “the most significant changes to the criminal 
justice system in a generation.”93  Congress passed it in 2018, while the 
nation was still reeling from the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused 
by opioid abuse.  The Act does a number of things, including, but not 
limited to the following: 
 Increasing good time credit earning from forty-seven days per 
year to fifty-four; 
 Requiring the Bureau of Prisons to examine its capabilities in 
creating evidence-based recidivism reduction programs; and 
 Allowing participation in those programs to lead to incentives 
such as prerelease custody in a halfway house, increased 
visitation opportunities, email access, commissary funds, 
etc.94 
                                                          
 91.   Id. 
 92.   For more information on how the crack baby problem was a myth, see Michael Winerip, 
Revisiting the ‘Crack Babies’ Epidemic That Was Not, N.Y. TIMES: RETRO REPORT (May 20, 2013), 
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 93.   Nicholas Fandos & Maggie Haberman, Trump Embraces a Path to Revise U.S. Sentencing 
and Prison Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/ 
prison-sentencing-trump.html [https://perma.cc/R8AT-MT7P]. 
 94.   Frequently Asked Questions on the First Step Act, S. 756, FAMM, https://famm.org/wp-
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Therefore, under the Act, certain populations of federal prisoners will 
qualify for release sooner than they would have otherwise.  Additionally, 
for another limited number of inmates, life in prison will be made more 
palatable in exchange for the inmates becoming “less dangerous” through 
the recidivism reduction programs.  Though these are welcomed changes, 
the First Step Act has been criticized for not truly being sweeping criminal 
justice reform.95  A main point of contention for critics is that it does not 
“eliminate mandatory minimums, restore judicial discretion, reduce the 
national prison population, and mitigate disparate impacts on communities 
of color.”96  Though the First Step Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010 retroactive—meaning that it will apply the newer 18-1 powder 
cocaine to crack cocaine ratio to inmates serving sentences under the older 
100-1 ratio—it will only affect approximately 2600 federal inmates, and 
petitions for release are still subject to judicial discretion.97  Ultimately, 
though the purported focus during the opioid crisis is treatment and 
welfare, sentencing is still being used as a weapon disproportionately fired 
at Black offenders.  The momentum of the opioid crisis gives legislators 
and criminal justice advocates the opportunity to move away from a 
warfare model of sentencing. 
Leaving behind a warfare model of drug sentencing means 
acknowledging the failure of sentencing as a weapon in the War on Drugs.  
The mandatory minimum sentences of the ‘80s did not reduce the use of 
crack cocaine, though that was the target of the harsh sentencing scheme.  
According to reports from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 
(NHSDA),98 from 1988–1992, “there was no change in the monthly use of 
crack.”99  When we focus on cocaine use generally, rather than solely crack 
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 96.   Lydia Wheeler, House Judiciary Delays Markup of Prison Reform Bill, THE HILL (Apr. 25, 
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[https://perma.cc/BL7W-9ZWT]. 
 97.   Justin George, What’s Really in the First Step Act?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/16/what-s-really-in-the-first-step-act [https://perma.cc/ 
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 98.   In 2002, the NHSDA was renamed the National Survey on Drug Use and Health.  National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., 
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perma.cc/JLV2-LDBF] (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).  
 99.   See 1995 REPORT, supra note 38, at 32.  
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cocaine, while it is true that cocaine use in the United States has declined 
since the consumption levels seen in the 1980s and 1990s,100 it is unlikely 
that this reduction had anything to do with sentencing law.  Most of this 
decrease in cocaine use has happened since 2006 and has been attributed 
to “a severe cocaine shortage, reflected in rapidly falling purity levels and 
a consequent rise in the cost per unit of pure cocaine, doubling over the 
2006–2009 period.”101  This decline seems to have little to nothing to do 
with penalties for cocaine offenses.  Instead, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime reports that “in 2007, five of the 20 largest individual 
cocaine seizures ever made were recorded,” causing large-scale disruption 
to the cocaine supply.102  Yet we continue to operate with the 1986 drug 
sentencing model based on mandatory minimum sentencing laws. 
Abandoning a warfare model of drug sentencing also means admitting 
that using sentencing as a weapon can and has been abused.  The purported 
purpose of the sentencing scheme adopted in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 was to target major drug trafficking.  However, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission has reported that low-level crack offenses represent more 
than sixty percent of federal crack defendants, and the harsh crack cocaine 
penalties “apply most often to offenders who perform low-level trafficking 
functions, wield little decision-making authority, and have limited 
responsibility.”103  Because of the misuse of the sentencing weapon: 
African American drug defendants have a 20 percent greater chance of 
being sentenced to prison than white drug defendants.  Between 1994 
and 2003, the average time served by African Americans for drug 
offenses increased by 62 percent, compared to an increase of 17 percent 
for white drug offenders.  Moreover, African Americans now serve 
virtually as much time in prison for a drug offense (58.7 months) as 
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whites do for a violent offense (61.7 months).104 
A shift to a welfare model of sentencing is imperative to rectify this 
injustice.  The first step in moving from a warfare to a welfare model of 
sentencing is to repeal the mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws.  The 
only purpose of those laws is to serve as weapons in the War on Drugs.  
Only then can we begin crafting a welfare model of sentencing that will 
embrace the rehabilitative purpose of the opioid epidemic discourse of the 
day.  Under a welfare model of drug sentencing, we can redirect funding 
to challenge agencies and organizations to partner with the criminal justice 
system in order to think of ways to address the underlying social issues 
faced by all drug offenders.  This approach more closely aligns with the 
welfare approach the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and respected medical experts have taken in response to the opioid crisis.  
These agencies have taken such an approach because they recognize that 
eradicating drug abuse requires a comprehensive plan that requires better 
data and better research.105  The same can be said for drug sentencing.  
Rather than relying on incarceration and mandatory minimum sentencing 
as our main criminal justice responses to drug offenses, meaningful 
sentencing reform requires better data and better research on how (or if) 
punishment can actually be used to curb drug abuse.  Only by 
reconceptualizing the role of sentencing in this way can we begin to 
seriously address the issues of drug abuse in this country. 
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